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NOTES
THE PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION:
A LEGAL ANALYSIS OF AN ADMINISTRATIVE SYSTEM
This report comprises an effort to examine the workings of the
Public Service Commission of New Mexico. The method used is
a simple form of systems analysis.' Study of the structure, the
inputs and the processes results in identification of a number of
deficiencies. Where deficiencies are identified, this study attempts
to define their origins and trace their effects through the major
outputs, rates and return on investment. Then, assessing deficiencies in terms of the entire system and environment, this study
suggests ways in which the activity of the Public Service
Commission can be strengthened and improved.
As one of the early great industrial nations, the United States
was among the first to apply regulation to the energy industries.
From about 1880 into the 1920s, basic patterns of regulation were
established. Monopoly powers were granted to producers in
exchange for the public right to oversee decisions affecting
control, distribution and use of energy. This first regulatory phase
culminated in the 1930s when, having experienced the consequences of financial disaster in the energy industries, the federal
government and many state agencies extended their power to
participate in ordering arrangements for financing, ownership
and management. 2
The first regulatory phase produced a great body of scholarship, statutory and decisional law, administrative practice and
management policy. All of it dealt with the corporation and its
duties to investors, and with the needs of society for energy,
delivered reliably and at reasonable cost. Since 1940, the lines of
legal development have been substantially at an end.3
Since the mid- 1960's, there has been a resurgence of interest in
the regulation of energy. There are three identifiable areas of
concern. First, problems of adequacy, reliability and availability
of service have been dramatized by failures ranging from
I. This report is an abridgement of a paper prepared for Professor A. E. Utton's class in
Administrative Law at UNM Law School and which is on file in the New Mexico Law Review
office.
2. T. Gies, The Need for New Concepts in Public Utility Regulation, in Utility Regulation 8 (W.
Shepherd and T. Gies eds. 1966).
3. Id.
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brownouts and blackouts, to corporate bankruptcies in regulated
industries. Second, a widespread and growing concern for
environmental quality has resulted in pressures to control
locations of energy-producing plants and their emissions of noise,
smoke and odor. Third, the poor have attempted, sometimes
improved access to goods and services,
successfully, to obtain
4
including energy.
In 1941 the Public Service Commission became a major part of
the process by which decisions are made on the control,
5
distribution and use of energy resources in New Mexico. That
process is extensive. It begins with the producers-those in
immediate charge of energy resources. Producer decisions come
to the Commission for ratification or adjustment. The decisional
process goes on in the courts and among the public. Producers,
Commission, courts and consumers all feed information back to
the decisional process and to the legislature which may alter or
add to the decisional rules.
In this lengthy process the role of the Commission is critical. It
is the only state agency which has as its sole purpose the duty of
applying public policy to the essential questions of energy
control, distribution and use. The Commission is the first formal
point in the decisional process in which the consumer and public
interests are brought to bear.
THE LAW: STATUTES AND CASES

Statutory law is the structure upon which the utility regulation
system is built and the great constraint within which it operates.
Judicial decisions have similar importance. It is a fundamental
rule of the law that, when private property is affected with a
public interest, it ceases to be in juris privatii only, and becomes
is in the legislature and
subject to public regulation. The power
6
administratively.
may be exercised
The New Mexico Public Utilities Act states:
It is the declared policy of the state that the public interest, the
interest of consumers, and the interest of investors require the
regulation and supervision of such public utilities to the end that
reasonable and proper services shall be available at fair, just and
reasonable rates, and to the end that capital and investment may
4.

Id.

5. Laws 1941, ch. 84, §§ I to 86, at present codified in N.M. Stat. Ann.§§ 68-3-1 to 68-11-13
(Repl. 1961, Supp. 1971).
6. 73 C.J.S. Public Utilities §§ I to 10(1951).
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be encouraged and attracted so as to provide for the construction,
development and extension, without unnecessary duplication
and
economic waste, of proper plants and facilities for the rendition
of
service to the general public and to industry. 7

In two cases on the point, New Mexico's courts have held
that
the public interest dominates those of consumers and investors.8
The present scope of the act is broad. Only municipally owned
utilities and H class counties are excluded from its provisions,
unless they elect to come within the act's terms. 9 At the
present
time, the Commission's jurisdiction extends to seven investor-owned electric and seven investor-owned natural gas utilities,
twenty-one rural cooperatives, twenty-four investor-owned
water
utilities (most of which are quite small, serving only
one
subdivision), three liquified petroleum gas utilities, and
five
utility associations.10
Practice, opinions of the attorney general and judicial
dicta
support the proposition that the essential jurisdictional
test is
whether or not [services] are open to the use and service of

all members of the public who may require it."1

The Commission's grant of jurisdiction appears very broad.
Several New Mexico cities and towns operate their own utilities;
none have elected to accept P.S.C. jurisdiction. With
that
exception, however, the Commission's jurisdiction over utilities
is
complete and has been supported by the courts and the Attorney
General.
A.

The Commission-Powersand Duties
The statute provides that commissioners will be appointed
for
six-year terms by the Governor with the advice and consent
of
the State Senate. By statute, they may be removed for
"incompetency, neglect of duty, or malfeasance in office,"
or for
accepting "any gift, gratuity, emolument, or employment"
any person interested in any public utility. Prior to removal,from
the
statute provides for notice and an opportunity for hearing
before
the governor."2
7. N.M. Stat. Ann.§ 68-3-1 (Repl. 1961, Supp. 1971).
8. Southwestern Pub. Serv. Co. v. Artesia Alfalfa Growers
Ass'n, 67 N.M. 108, 353 P.2d 62
(1960); Hogue v. Superior Util., 53 N.M. 452, 210 P.2d 938
(1949).
9. N.M. Stat. Ann. § 68-5-4 (Repl. 1961, Supp. 1971).
10. 26 Report 36-37 Public Service Commission (1969-70).
11. 73 C.J.S. Public Utilities § 2 (1951); Llano, Inc. v. Southern
Union Gas Co., 75 N.M. 7, 18,
399 P.2d 646, 653 (1964); cf. [1953-1954] N.M. Att'y
Gen. Biennial Rep. No. 92, at 109;
[1947-1948l N.M. Att'y Gen. Biennial Rep. No. 181, at 153.
12. N.M. Stat. Ann. § 68-4-5 (Repl. 1961).
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The statute notwithstanding, commissioners have been subject
to direct and continuing political inflence. Very few commissioners have served as many as four years; almost none have
served six. Incoming governors routinely request that commissioners submit resignations, and incumbent commissioners
routinely do so. This state of affairs results in the appointment of
new commissioners who rarely have appreciable knowledge of
the field. It militates against the appointment of substantial and
responsible commissioners. It13also prevents the accumulation of
expertise on the Commission.
The absence of tenure is a critical constraint upon the
Commission's ability to regulate effectively. Utility regulation is a
broad and complex field. It requires much expert knowledge.
Masses of detailed facts call for fine analytical study and detailed
synthesis.
Underlying the Governor's power to remove is a 1927 case,
State ex rel. Ulrich v. Sanchez, 14 in which the State Supreme
Court upheld, two to one, the power of the Governor to remove
appointed officials summarily. The case arose when two incumbent associate state tax commissioners, Felipe Sanchez y Baca
and John S. Clark, were fired for incompetence by an incoming
governor. The two objected to the general charge of incompetence and called for a hearing. They were forcibly ejected from
their capitol offices. To settle the matter, the State brought quo
warranto proceedings. The officials raised two defenses: that as
officers appointed with the Senate's advice and consent, they
could be removed only by impeachment, and that they had been
denied due process in the absence of notice, hearing and
evidence. The court disposed of the first defense by observing
that impeachment proceedings are available only against public
officials elected by the people at large.
On the second issue, the court began with the State Constitution, Art. 5, Section 5, allowing the Governor to remove for
incompetence, and went on to consider whether, under the
constitution, notice and hearing are required. There are no such
13. H. Weihofen, Report to the Committee for Study and Recommendation of Reorganization
of the Executive Branch 14 (1952) [hereinafter cited the Weihofen Report]; Interview with Morris
Yashvin, Commissioner, Pub. Serv. Comm'n, in Santa Fe, New Mexico, Nov. 12, 1971
[hereinafter cited Yashvin Interview] at which Commissioner Yashvin reported that, with the
exception of Governors Burroughs and King, the Commission has had two majority and one
minority party members. Under Burroughs and King, the Commission was entirely Democratic.
14. 32 N.M. 265, 255 P.1077 (1927).
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requirements, said the court: "...
omission from the provision
on removals of any requirement of notice or hearing must be
regarded as the expression of an intention that notice or hearing
should not be essential to the enforcement thereof.' 15
Mr. Justice Parker entered a strong dissent that would have
restricted the Governor's power of removal to those officials he
himself had appointed. 16 Ulrich remains law in New Mexico. It
was relied upon as recently as January, 1971, in an opinion of the
Attorney General that supported Governor King's summary
removal of two members of the board of the State Health and
Social Services Department. 17 Ulrich implants a major element of
weakness in the Commission's structure. Its implications in the
administrative sphere have been touched upon here. Its political
implications are more significant. They will be discussed in a
following section of this report.
Broad powers over the conduct of utility enterprises are
delegated to the Commission. It has general and exclusive power
and jurisdiction to regulate and supervise rates, service regulations, and security transactions of every public utility. Sales for
resale to the public are subject to regulation, but only insofar as is
required for determination of "reasonable cost."' 8 Securities are
subject to regulation as to time and terms of issuance and value
of issue, unless payable at periods of 18 months or less.
The Commission may prescribe uniform accounts, inspect or
require the production of records, and may set standards for
service, accuracy of metering devices and safety. To enforce its
orders and standards, the Commission and its staff are empowered to enter any premises occupied by any utility after
giving proper notice. 19
B. The Valuation Power
The Commission's power of valuation is the nucleus of its
regulatory authority. The rate-setting process is founded upon a
calculation whereby total assets in public service are mutliplied
by a decided percentage rate of return to yield a maximum
allowable profit after tax to the utility company. The statute
provides that, in determining value of property in public service,
15.
16.
17.
18.
19.

Id. at
Id.at
N.M.
N.M.
N.M.

289, 255 P. at 7610.
300, 255 P. at 1090.
Att'y Gen. Opinion No. 71-6 (Jan. 21, 1971).
Stat. Ann. 68-5-4(Repl. 1961, Supp. 1971).
Stat. Ann. §§6 -5-16 to 24 (Repl. 1961, Supp. 1971).
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the Commission will "give due consideration to the history and
development of the property and business of the particular public
utility, to the original cost thereof, and to the cost of reproduction
as a going concern, and to other elements of value recognized by
20
the laws of the land for rate making purposes." The inclusion of
what the statute terms "cost of reproduction as a going concern"
is a matter of considerable significance and controversy.
Simply put, rates are the product of two variables: first, the
value of property in public service and second, the percentage
applied (often identified as rate of return) to yield the amount to
be produced by the utiilty as revenue. "A public utility," says one
authority, "is entitled to charge and receive for its product or
service such rates, and such only, as will give it as profit a fair
return on the reasonable value of its property at the time used
and useful in the public service .... -21 And, says another
authority:
In general, rates are reasonable or fair if they provide sufficient
revenue to cover the total costs properly incurred in furnishing the
required service. Total costs include the following four cost
(2) depreciation charges; (3)
categories: (1) Operating expenses;
22
investment.
on
return
(4)
and
taxes

Operating expenses, depreciation charges and taxes are definite, factual concepts. As facts, they appear periodically on the
company's operating statements. But the fair value of investment
is something else again: it is indefinite, nonfactual and, at best,
difficult to ascertain and subject to wide differences of opinion.
By statute, however, the Public Service Commission is required
to set a "fair value" on utility companies' investments as a first
step in setting rates.
The fair value concept had its origin in the U.S. Supreme
Court's decision in Smyth v. Ames. 23 In that 1897 case, the court
said: ". . . [T]he basis of all calculations as to the reasonableness of rates to be charged by a corporation . . . must be the

fair value of the property being used by it for the convenience of
the public."' 24 Among components of fair value, said the Smyth
court, were original cost and reproduction cost. The latter is
defined as the cost of replacing a facility at the present time.
20.
21.
22.
23.
24.

N.M. Stat. Ann § 68-5-14 (Repl. 1961).
73 C.J.S. Public Utilities § 13(1951).
Parker, The Regulation of Public Utilities, 10 Natural Resources J.828 (1970).
169 U.S. 466 (1897).
Id. at 546.
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That decision led into four decades of conflict over the
respective weights to be given original and reproduction costs.
The conflict came to an end in most jurisdictions in 1944 with the
U.S. Supreme Court's decision in Federal Power Commission v.
Hope NaturalGas Co. :25
Rates which enable the company to operate successfully, to
maintain its financial integrity, to attract capital, and to compensate its investors for risks assumed certainly cannot be condemned
as invalid, even though they might produce only a meager return
on the so-called "fair-value" rate base.2 6

The Hope decision has been interpreted to have abandoned fair value in favor of any method producing reasonable
results:
From the investor or company point of view it is important that
there be enough revenue not only for operating expenses but also
for the capital costs of the business. These include service on the
debt and dividends on the stock. 27

The statement in the Hope decision appears to tie reasonableness to the cost of money. That cost, of course, is factual; it is
reflected in disbursements for interest and in funding of debt
retirement on corporate financial statements. What is not factual
and what is not reflected in the statements is the cost of building,
at present, facilities that in fact were built and put into service in
the past. Commissions attempting to administer the reproduction
cost standard "are faced with conjectural and conflicting claims,
with questionable weight to be accorded to the dubious amounts,
and with the burdensome, time consuming, costly, and inconclusive task of making the required determination."28
It is important here to note that, in the critical matter of
ratemaking, the Public Service Commission is bound by its
statute to a method ruled unnecessary by the U.S. Supreme
Court twenty-eight years ago. The Commission is not free to
devise less cumbersome and more reasonable methods. This is
indeed a major structural constraint on its ability to function
effectively. In effect, the Commission has the power to calculate.
But it has no power to alter its mode of calculation.
Incumbent commissioners and their staff are acutely aware of
25. 320 U.S. 591 (1944).
26. Id.at 605.
27. Id. at 603.
28. Parker, supra note 22, at 831, quoting J. Bauer, Updating Public Utility Regulation:
Assuring Fair Rates and Fair Returns 59 (1966).
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this state of affairs. Amendatory legislation was introduced in the
State Legislature in 1971.29 That bill would have confined
valuation of investment ". . . to evidence of the actual, legiti'30
mate costs of the property when first devoted to public use,"
reproduction cost standard. The
doing away entirely with the
31
measure died in committee.
C. Utilities-Dutiesand Restrictions
The statute imposes on regulated utilities the requirement that
rates be just and reasonable, and that service be adequate,
efficient and reasonable. Schedules of rates showing classifications of users must be approved by the Commission and be
available at the utility for public inspection. Rates actually
charged must adhere to those published. No utility may discriminate among users of the same class or between classes or
localities. 32 At hearings to increase rates, the statute places the
burden of proof on the utility to show that the charge is just and
reasonable. New rates may be suspended pending a hearing for
no longer than 12 months. Suspended rates, however, may be
33
made effective under bond or with the Commission's consent.
Where the Commission finds any proposed rate to be unjust,
unreasonable or in violation of law, it may order the utility to
submit new rate schedules or the Commission may itself set
rates. 34
By a 1967 amendment, utilities must obtain a certificate of
necessity and convenience prior to beginning new construction
unless the new facility is to extend service in a place already
served, or unless the work is in the ordinary course of business.
A 1971 amendment declares the policy of the State Legislature
to be that electric facilities comply with air and water pollution
control standards, as set by the Environmental Improvement
Agency. 35 The P.S.C. must withhold certificates until compliance
with environmental standards, but it may not set such standards
29. H.B. 260, 30th N.M. St. Legislature, 1st Sess. (1971).
30. Id.
31. See the section of this report concerning the Public Service Company in legislative politics,
infra.
32. N.M. StatAnn.§ §68-6-1 to6(Repl. 1961).
33. N.M. Stat. Ann. § 68-6-7A to 7C (Repl. 1961, Supp. 1971).
34. N.M. Stat. Ann.§§68-6-7D (Supp. 1971); but the P.S.C. may not order flow-through of
refunds to the utility, N.M. Elec. Serv. Co. v. N.M. Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 81 N.M. 683, 472 P.2d 648
(1970).
35. N.M. Stat. Ann § 68-7-1.2 (Supp. 1971).
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itself. Where, however, the Commission finds that local zoning
ordinances or land-use plans are "unreasonably restrictive," it
may void them. 36 As a structural matter this seems a major
weakness: responsibilities for administration of environmental
standards are split, with the result that clear-cut authority has no
single resting place.
D. Orders,Appellate Review and Enforcement
On completion of hearings, the Commission must make and
file its findings of fact and order. "The findings of fact,"
according to the statute, "shall consist only of such ultimate facts
as are necessary to determine the controverted questions presented by the proceeding." 37 The cases and the authorities put
this directive in question.
The New Mexico Supreme Court recently said that ultimate
fact means conclusion of fact, not a very helpful observation,
perhaps. The Court continued, "The requirement of only a
finding of the ultimate fact is not the most desirable method of
assuring clear thinking by the administrative agency or effective
judicial review of the agency's decision." 38 Professor Cooper's
text on administrative law agrees: administrative decisions must
contain findings of fact sufficient to permit judicial review and to
improve the agency's decision-making processes. "Just, carefully
reasoned, and fully informed decisions" rely on findings presented in sufficient detail to support conclusions. 39 And Cooper cites
the Revised State Model Administrative Procedure Act: "Findings of fact, if set forth in statutory language, shall be accompanied by a concise and explicit statement of the underlying facts
supporting the findings." 40
While reasoned findings are not required, a complete hearing
record is. The Commission must furnish a court reporter whose
transcript must be made available to any party to the hearing on
payment of a reasonable fee for reproduction. 4 1
Record requirements notwithstanding, the statute's failure to
call for detailed findings is a major deficiency. If there is no
36. N.M. Stat. Ann §68-7-1.2H (Supp. 1971).
37. N.M. Stat. Ann. §68-8-14(Repl. 1961).
38. International Minerals and Chem. Corp. v. N.M. Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 81 N.M. 280, 283,
466 P.2d 557, 560 (1970).
39. F. Cooper, 2 State Administrative Law 465-68 (1965).
40. Id. at 469. The N.M. Administrative Procedure Act, not applicable to the P.S.C., contains
the language quoted at N.M. Stat. Ann. §40-32-12A (Supp. 1971).
41. N.M. Stat. Ann. 68-8-15 (Repl. 1961, Supp. 1971).
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appeal, neither the parties nor those who come after have access
to the reasons behind the decision. If an appeal ensues, the court
has the record and the "ultimate facts," but it will not have the
reasoning drawn from the Commission's expertise which is an
essential element of administrative usefulness. In effect, the court
may be left with the parties' contentions, supporting partisan
conclusions, but no support whatever for conclusions founded
upon the consumer and public interests.
If nothing else, the absence of required reasoned opinions may
encourage sloppiness and unthinking decision-making among
well-trained and specialized people. It is more likely to do so
where, as on the Commission, those who decide have no specific
training and no significant specialized experience.
The Commission's final order exhausts administrative process.
Parties aggrieved by Commission actions may petition for review
in the district court of the county in which the complaint or
controversy originated. Trial is to the court on the record. The
of showing that the order is
petitioner bears the burden
42
unlawful.
unreasonable or
By statute ". . . [Tihe court shall have no power to modify
said action or order appealed from, but shall either affirm or
annul and vacate the same."'43 The court's incapacity to modify is
contrary to the directives of both the state and the Revised Model
Administrative Procedure Acts.44 The court's inability to order
further proceedings on remand seems contrary to efficient
practice. A vacation sets aside the Commission's decision,
without substituting judicial guidance or direction.
Pendency of judicial review does not of itself stay or suspend
Commission orders. The court may, however, order stay or
suspension. A party may obtain suspension by posting a supersedeas bond. 45 District Court decisions are appealed directly to
the latter court's rules for
the Supreme Court, in accordance with
46
actions.
civil
in
appeal of judgments
The entire appellate procedure is contrary to the State
Administrative Procedure Act, which does not apply to the
Commission. Under the Act appeals are directed from the
42. N.M. Stat. Ann. § 68-9-1 to 4 (Repl. 1961, Supp. 1971).
43. N.M. Stat. Ann §68-9-5 (Repl. 1961).
44. N.M. Stat. Ann §4-32-22 (Supp. 1971); Revised Model State Administrative Procedure Act
15(1961).
45.

N.M. Stat. Ann § 68-9-6 (Repl. 1961).

46. N.M. Stat Ann. §68-9-7 (Repl. 1961, Supp. 1971).
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administrative agency to the State Court of Appeals. By this
procedure, drafters of the procedure act hoped to build a body of
expertise in the appellate court.47 The present mode of appeal
does not further that purpose.
The cases demonstrate that the scope of judicial review of
Commission orders is limited to whether the order is unreasonable or unlawful, whether it is supported by substantial evidence,
and whether the Commission acted within the scope of its
authority. Two cases are directly in point. In Llano, Inc. v.
Southern Union Gas Co.,48 the State Supreme Court defined the
scope of its review. In New Mexico Elec. Serv. Co. v. Lea County
Electric Cooperative,49 the opinion is clear that the Commission's
findings failed to disclose substantial evidence that the utility had
not begun construction within the one year allowed for the
beginning of work under a certificate.
The Commission is authorized by statute to bring action for
mandamus or for an injunction in the district court against any
person believed not in compliance with the Public Utility Act and
Commission orders issued under it. Responsibility for prosecution is delegated to the Attorney General, in mandatory language. 50 The State consents to suits against the Commission
where it is alleged that it exceeded its jurisdiction or authority, or
where it failed to perform a duty. 5 '
The statute grants calendar preference to causes involving the
Commission. It specifies a range of fines from $100 to $1000 for
each violation of a Commission order, and directs that each
violation (where continuing, each day in violation after conviction) is a separate offense. Penalties are cumulative and do not
bar criminal prosecution. 52
THE COMMISSIONERS AND STAFF

At the present time, the Public Service Commission consists of
three commissioners, of whom only one has been in office more
than one year, and of a staff including an administrator, a lawyer,
a budget officer, two engineers, three rate analysts, an account
47. Lecture by Albert Utton, Professor of Law, U.N.M. School of Law, Sept. 17, 1971.
48. 75 N.M. 7, 399 P.2d 646 (1964).
49. 76 N.M. 434, 415 P.2d 556 (1966).
50. N.M. Stat. Ann §68-10-1 (Repl. 1961).
51. N.M. Stat. Ann §68-10-2 (Repl. 1961); Potash Co. of American v. N.M. Pub. Serv.
Comm'n. 62 N.M. 1,303 P.2d 908 (1956).
52. N.M. Stat. Ann §68-10-3 to 7 (Repl. 1961).
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technician, and two secretaries. A vacancy exists for a natural gas
engineer, but the Commission is not attempting to fill the
position for budgetary reasons. 53 The staffing table has changed
in its internal details over the last two decades. The total
employment of the Commission, however, is at the same level
today as it was when Professor Weihofen studied the agency
54
almost 20 years ago.

The Commission's responsibilities have grown. In 1949-1950, it
regulated 38 organizations with operating revenues of approximately $23 million. In the 1969-1970 fiscal year, it oversaw 5567
organizations with operating revenues of about $142.3 million.
Two decades ago, Professor Weihofen pointed out that, among
all commissioners and employees only one, Carroll R. Anderson,
had more than three years' experience with the agency. Anderson, the administrator, continues in the same role; he has now
Morris Yashvin is now in
served about 25 years.5 Commissioner
6
his fifth year of service.
The high rate of turnover among commissioners is part of
Ulrich's heritage. Typically, the commissioners' terms coincide
with the terms of the governors who appoint them. Over the past
15 years, eight commissioners have held office for two years, and
four years. Only two have survived into a fifth year of
six for 57
service.
Though no such practice is required by law, most governors
have organized the Commission with one member of the
minority party, and two representatives of the majority. Governors Burroughs (1958-1960) and King (incumbent) have ignored
the practice and appointed the full membership from their own
party, the Democrats. 58 In the past, it has been the carryover of a
minority member as a part of the majority on a new Commission
that has produced the only sign of continuity on the Commission
in the persons of the two members who have served into a fifth
year.
Whoever the governor, appointments have followed a consistent pattern. In no case has a member come to the Commission
53. Interview with James L. Parmelee, Staff Counsel for the Public Service Comm'n, in Santa
Fe, New Mexico, Nov. 12, 1971 [hereinafter cited Parmelee Interview].
54. The Weihofen Report, supra note 13.
55. 25 P.S.C. Report 10-45 (1969-70).
56. The Weihofen Report, supra note 13; Parmelee interview, supra note 53.
57. 26 P.S.C. Report (1969-70); and I I P.S.C. Report (1954-55).
58. Yishvin interview, supra note 13.

NEW MEXICO LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 3

with any credentials or experience in any field relating to
Commission business.5 9 It is hard to escape the impression that,
between absenceof qualifications for the job and high rate of
turnover, problems of nonprofessionalism and inexperience compound themselves.
Perhaps more to the point in terms of Commission structure
and the inputs to that structure, however, is the fact that
appointees must, in the nature of the case, carry into their offices
political and personal loyalties that are almost certain to conflict
with their duties to regulate in accordance with ". . . the public
interest, the interest of consumers, and the interest of investors. .... -60 It is precisely this importation of outside loyalties
into the regulatory arena that the concept of long, staggered
terms is intended to mitigate. And as long as Ulrich remains law,
commissioners are going to remain under pressure to attend to
outside loyalties.
The first observation coming to mind about the staff is that if it
was the right size in 1952, it cannot be the right size now. The
volume of work has increased enormously. But Weihofen, almost
20 years ago, took the position that the staff was then inadequate. 61 Until recently, the Commission's staff included a
certified public accountant. "We miss him greatly," says one
member of the P.S.C. staff.62 There is no one working for the
Commission at the present time who is professionally capable of
auditing utility company records, normally done prior to hearings
on applications for rate increases. 63
Likewise, the absence of a natural gas engineer is significant.
There is no one on the staff capable of auditing the quality of gas
service. 64 In fact, the heat content of one million cubic feet of
natural gas delivered in New Mexico may vary by almost 300
BTU, or by about 30 per cent of average, from Raton, where heat
content is least, to Floyd and Fort Sumner, where it is greatest. 65
Obviously, heat content is a major part of gas service quality. At
59. The incumbent chairman, Richard Montoya of Santa Fe, was appointed by Governor
King. A high-school graduate, he is a former Santa Fe police officer recently involved in real
estate. In some quarters, at least, his main qualification for his job is seen as his ability to deliver
large segments of the Santa Fe County vote. See the New Mexico Legislative Review, Nov. 1971,
at 14-15.
60. N.M. Stat. Ann. § 68-3-lB (Repl. 1961, Supp. 1971).
61. The Weihofen Report, supra note 13.
62. Parmelee interview, supra note 53.
63. Id.
64. Id.
65. 26 P.S.C. Report 30-31 (1969-70).
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present, that aspect of quality is wholly unaudited and unsupervised.
There are many other areas in which the P.S.C. is structurally
incapable of supervising service quality and compliance with
regulations. For example, accounts are audited only prior to
requests for rate increases, and then only for a limited span of
time. A firm exempts itself from Commission audits by the
Perhaps,
simple expedient of not requesting rate increases.
66
quality.
service
diminish
instead, it chooses to slightly
Structural incapacities to one side, one has the impression, at
least, that the present staff is dedicated and very hard-working
indeed. In these two recent large rate cases, involving the state's
staff challenged and finally
two largest public utilities, the 67
positions.
overcame the companies'
SYSTEMS INPUTS:
AND ENVIRONMENT
DOCUMENTS
PROCESS,

Generally, inputs are of two types. What are characterized
here as formal inputs fall into four categories: applications,
petitions, complaints and interventions. They are the documents
that trigger the administrative process of the Public Service
the
Commission. The operation of formal inputs is governed by
68 The
Procedure.
Commission's published Rules of Practice and
rules are the subject of the first part of this section. In the main,
however, inputs are shaped by those who submit them to the
Commission-primarily, the regulated utilities.
The formal inputs do not stand alone. They enter into the
process alongside an array of informal inputs. These informal
inputs arise in the environment for administration: partisan
politics, the State Legislature, and economic and social conditions.
A. The Input Process
The Commission Rules provide that hearings will begin
regularly on the first Monday of each month (rule 1). Proceedings
may be formal or informal, (rule 2). Intervention is permissible at
66. Parmelee interview, supra note 53; Yashvin interview, supra note 13.
Ct. Santa Fe
67. Southern Union Gas Co. v. Pub. Serv. Comm'n, Civil No. 41646 (Dist.
Ct. Santa
County, N.M. 1971), Public Service Co. v. Pub. Serv. Comm'n, Civil No. 41796 (Dist.
an escalator
for
Union
Southern
by
request
a
involving
case
Another
1971).
N.M.
Fe County,
Southern
clause tying the price of gas to consumers to the well-head cost is pending on appeal.
N.M. 1972),
Union Gas Co. v. Pub. Serv. Comm'n, Civil No. 44527 (Dist. Ct., Santa Fe County,
appeal docketed, No. 9486, N.M. Sup. Ct., 1972.
R.P.P.].
68. N.M. Pub. Serv. Comm'n Rev. Gen. Order I (Apr. 15, 1965) [hereinafter cited
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the Commission's discretion, which is to be exercised to assure
that proceedings are not unduly broadened (rule 9). The
Commission may initiate any action on its own motion (rule 10).
All hearings must be open to the public with at least twenty days
notice, except where the public interest demands prompt action
(rule 27). The rules may be modified or suspended to safeguard
the rights of the public (rule 50). A fee of $25 must accompany all
applications, petitions and complaints (rule 51).
Nowhere in the supporting statute 69 or in the rules themselves
is there specification of the rule-making process. In practice,
however, the Commission evidently follows a twenty-day notice
and hearing procedure on new rules. 70
The rules do not require confrontation, but the nature of the
hearing process makes confrontation usual. As a matter of
practice, the Commission will accept statements on any matter
from any person, whether in writing or delivered orally at
hearings. But only a formal intervenor or a party to the case have
the right to cross examine any witness. 71
Limitation of the right to cross examine is seen as critical by
the Commission's attorney, who strives to provide a "courtroom
format." "I think these are pretty good rules," he .says. "The
Environmental Improvegient Agency has a circus with its
rules-everybody can cross examine everybody." 72
Openness may well be the first and most essential touchstone
for sound administrative procedure. The Commission's hearings
are clearly open. Though there has been rather light traffic, the
Commission's policy has been to remain receptive and to
encourage access on the parts of all affected parties. The rules are
clearly stated and reasonably comprehensible.
What comes in under the rules, however, is seldom clearly
stated or reasonably comprehensible. And that fact is a direct
consequence of the fair value method, to which the Commission
must adhere by statute. The material asserted as factual in rate
proceedings is understandable only by the well-trained specialist.
And in New Mexico its level of comprehensibility is further
reduced by its conjectural character. In effect, the rules seem to
provide easy access to and openness of proceedings, the contents
of which very few people can understand.
69.
70.
71.
72.

N.M. Stat Ann. § 68-5-1 to 24 (Repl. 1961, Supp. 1971).
See, e.g., N.M. Pub. Serv. Comm'n Rev. Gen. Order 12 (April 15, 1965).
Parmelee interview, supra note 53.
Id.
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This is a major problem, and one of which commissioners and
staff are well aware. The rules by themselves have proven
insufficient to assure reasonable clarity and comprehensibility of
input. Several important consequences follow. Public and consumer counteraction can hardly occur when no one in the public
understands that action is being taken affecting his or her
interest. The Commission's staff, therefore, with all its limitations,
is often left alone to confront the vast array of legal and
accounting talent usually mustered by intervenors and applicants. The hearing record cannot contain much information
produced by the Commission and its staff. What goes forward on
appeal must be essentially what the parties at interest put into
the transcript.
Where the proceedings involve matters other than rates, the
defects of process imposed by the fair value method remain,
though probably somewhat less apparent. Again, the parties. at
interest are capable of mustering a great deal of talent. It is
difficult for affected individuals-Indians living on power line
routes, for example-to match the showing.
The fundamental defect in process, however, remains the fair
value method. Eliminating the defect will require statutory
changes. And that is a political proposition.
B. The Environmentfor A dministration
The environment amid which regulation occurs is of critical
importance to the administrative process. It is also very difficult
to evaluate. The political, economic and social factors are rarely
well documented. And the operation of these factors often results
in things left undone and in actions not taken.
1. Legislative Politics
Despite a legislative attempt to insulate incumbent commissioners from partisan politics, Ulrich73 continues to cast a long,
black shadow across tenure at the policy-making and legislating
levels of Commission function. New Mexico's regulated utilities
are highly potent politically. They are interested, of course, in
assuring that the Commission remain reasonably receptive to
their needs. They are far more interested in assuring that the
severance tax structure, now quite low, is not increased. They are
interested in maintaining a high degree of legislative influence to
73. 32 N.M. 265, 255 P. 1017.
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combat or emasculate potentially troublesome enactments such
as those dealing with environmental issues.
There are three subjects which seem ripe for legislative action
to the staff. The first is the Commission budget, which at present
is incapable of procuring an adequate staff to perform essential
duties. The second is the problem of fair value, which mires all
deliberations on rates in a swamp of conjecture and conflicting
opinion. 74 And the third is the problem of Ulrich which may,
given the force of stare decisis, require a constitutional amendment for its solution. 75
The first two of these subjects were presented to the most
recent meeting of the legislature. The Commission chairman is
reported to have "worked closely" with the chairman of the
House Appropriations Committee to obtain a modest budget
increase. The increase was insufficient, however, to fill the
vacancy existing for a natural gas engineer. 76
Staff members drafted and arranged for the introduction of a
measure that would have deleted the fair value component of the
valuation process.

77

"Our lobbying effort was pretty pitiful," says

the Commission's counsel. "And the utilities had a lot of
' 78
clout."

The proposal died quietly in committee.

The one measure affecting its regulatory powers that did get
through the legislature in 1971 confers on the Commission
jurisdiction to approve plant locations where the facility is of
300,000 kilowatts or more, and transmission line routes where the
line is to transmit at least 230 kilovolts.

79

Very few plants outside

the Four Corners area reach the 300,000 kilowatt level. Most new
major transmission lines, however, are within the new grant of
jurisdiction.
"The Commission is weak as a matter of politics," says its
counsel. "It comes out in what we don't do. We don't get into
audits. We don't get into heat value regulations. We don't require
cost of service studies. We don't do these things because we don't
have the money to do them and we don't have the money
because we're politically weak."' 80
74. Yashvin interview, supra note 13; Parmelee interview, supra note 53.
75. Parmelee interview, supra note 53.
76. Id.
77. H.B. 260, 30th N.M. St. Legislature, Ist Sess. (1971); H.B. 345, 30th N.M. St. Legislature,
1st Sess. (1971).
78. Parmelee interview, supra note 53.
79. N.M. Stat. Ann. § 68-7-1.2 (Supp. 1971).
80. Parmelee interview, supra note 53.
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2. The Economic Environment
From the standpoint of a public utility, a great multitude of
small consumers does not wield the influence of one or two large
ones. The utilities' market in New Mexico consists of thousands
of small residential and commercial uses of energy and of a very
few major users. The two largest are the U.S. Government and
which is the single largest customer of
the Public Service Co.,
81
Southern Union Gas.
One important question is whether the largest users of energy
are paying at least enough to permit the producer of energy to
break even on the sale. While it has been held that no reasonable
method of computing rates is foreclosed, as long as the public,
82
consumer and investor interests are taken into account, it seems
clear that any rate that fails to return costs of services forces other
classes of users to subsidize the beneficiaries of exceptionally low
rates.8 3 Commissioners and staff believe that the federal
government, the Public Service Co. and other major users may
be the beneficiaries of subsidized rates.
Nothing in statute, regulation or accepted administrative
practice prevents the Commission from investigating possible
inequities on its own motion. On the contrary, the statute makes
several provisions authorizing such action.8 4 The Public Utilities
Act provides that unreasonable preferences, prejudices and
advantages are unlawful.8 5 Yet the commissioners have fallen
back on a practice86 of sanctioning "arms-length contracts,"
whatever their terms.
"The big users are getting a break," says one commissioner.
"They are probably subsidized. ' 87 But like his colleagues, this
commissioner indicates no inclination to seek the funds to
support auditors, or to engage in the tedious process of acquiring
detailed cost-of-service reports and subjecting them to critical
and professional analysis.
3. The Social Environment
"For the last three to five years, the inputs have been coming
81. Id.
82. State v. Mountain States Telephone & Telegraph. 54 N.M. 315, 224 P.2d 155 (1950); and cf
Panhandle Eastern v. F.P.C., 324 U.S. 635 (1945).
83. 73 C.J.S. Public Utilities § 25 (1951).
84. See, e.g., N.M. Stat.-Ann.§ §68-5-4, 14, 16, 68-6-7 (Repl. 1961. Supp. 1971) and Rule 10.
R.P.P. supra note 68.
85. N.M. Stat. Ann. § 68-6-6 (Repl. 1961).
86. Parmelee interview, supra note 53.
87. Yashvin interview, supra note 13.
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in," says an incumbent commissioner. "And over the last four or
five months," he adds, "even the newspapers have become aware
of our existence." 88
Two factors have contributed to the new visibility of the Public
Service Commission. The first and by far the most important is
the wave of concern for the environment that has swept the
nation in the last three years. The second was a period during the
summer of 1971 when the New Mexico Public Service Co. found
itself unable to provide clean water in Santa Fe. The matter
came before the Commission as regulator. A great many people,
especially in Santa Fe, became aware of the Commission's
existence. "Ever since last summer," says one commissioner,
"we've had newspapermen at every meeting. We never
saw them
before that.' ' 89
Environmental issues are sharply felt in much of New Mexico.
The State's residents take pride in the beauty of their natural
surroundings. That beauty has been markedly degraded in recent
years by emissions from new plants in the northwest corner of the
State. Environmentalists have turned their attention to the
Commission in an attempt to direct regulatory authority toward
behavior damaging the scenic and health qualitites of New
Mexico. The Commission permitted two environmentalist
groups, the Sierra Club and the New Mexico Citizens for Clean
Air and Water, to intervene in recent proceedings on an
application for a certificate to build a transmission line from
northwestern New Mexico to Tucson. 90 The 22 days of hearings
generated extensive publicity 9 ' and intense public interest in
environmental matters and had the immediate effect of intensifying Commission relations with other agencies of state
government, most notably the Environmental Improvement
Agency (EIA) and the State Planning Office. The EIA is part of
the State Health and Social Services Department, the largest
bureaucracy in state government. At this point, it is the repository
of most statutory authority to act on environmental matters. "I'm
uncertain and worried about EIA conflicts," says one Commission employee. "We know, for example, that water quality is a
part of adequate water service. We're willing to rely on EIA as to
88.
89.
90.
9 1.

Id.
Id.
Yashvin interview, supra note 13: Parmelee interview, supra note 53.
See, e.g. Albuquerque Journal, Nov. 10, 1971, at I, col. 1.
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that. But there's the possibility of confusing the quality of service
and the quality of life issues. We have concurrent jurisdiction.
EIA should not make decisions going to quantity or 92to volume of
service. And our decisions should not go to quality.
In recent years, the poor have displayed a new consciousness of
their social problems. In New Mexico, the awareness has grown
quite recently in association with ethnic movements. Thus far, the
organized poor do not seem to have perceived the likelihood that
environmental controls will increase costs of energy, thus making
energy less available to them. When this is realized, however,
action may well be focused in the forum provided by the
Commission.
THE SYSTEM PROCESSES

Ongoing Administrative A ctivities
Day in and day out, the Public Service Commission administers a number of routine duties. These include the collection of a
number of financial and operational reports, the maintenance of
current files of effective rates, and administrative duties in
preparation for hearings, which include sending of notice,
issuance of subpeonas, preparation of transcripts and issuance of
orders.
The Commission's administrator is responsible for these duties.
From all accounts, he was discharging them efficiently 20 years
ago, and he continues to do so at present. 93 "This may be the
only agency in the state," said one source, "that knows it can find
94
what it files."
A survey of the Commission's annual reports for the last 15
years discloses no action apparently traceable to deficiencies in
routine administration. 95 Litigation is frequent. Almost all of it
involves appeals from rate determinations. Many reports, however, list actions for court orders supporting Commission decisions. As a rule, these involve proprietary utilities that have failed
96
to meet reporting and fee requirements set out by the statute.
The major means of ongoing enforcement are unannounced
spot checks by engineers in the field and by accountants at home
A.

92.
93.
94.
95.
96.

Parmelee interview, supra note 53.
Weihofen report. supra note 13.
Parmelee interview. supra note 53.
11P.S.C. Report (1954-55) etseq.
26 P.S.C. Report 56-57 (1969-70): 25 P.S.C. Report 62-63 (1968-69).
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offices. Because the staff is small, such checks are rather
infrequent. "But we're not aware of cheating," says the Commission's counsel. 97
B. Complaint Procedure
For the last two or three years, if not before, the Commission
has maintained a policy of rapid followup on complaints. The
great majority of informal cases are cleared with a few telephone
calls. Most involve complaints of wrong rates. Most come from
98
businessmen.
Formal complaints require a hearing and have, in recent years,
given rise to a substantial volume of litigation. The Commission's
most recent published report lists three major cases that had their
origins in complaints, rather than in applications or petitions. 99
Last year for the first time, the Commission went beyond
responding to complaints to bring a proceeding, on its own
motion, to force a utility to refund to its customers a $935,000
overcharge rebate. Where commercial customers had contracts
calling for such adjustments, the rebate was passed on to users.
The Commission ordered flow through rebates to all
customers. 100 The utility appealed. The Commission was overruled in the district court and later, by the State Supreme
Court.' 0 ' The case, though it did not succeed, indicates that the
Commission's awareness of its duty to consumers may be
increasing. At a minimum, the case indicates an attitude very
different from that of ten years ago, when the Commission
reported that complaints were decreasing, and that0 2 ample
evidence suggested utilities were continuing to improve.'
Evidently, the great majority of Commission determinations
are acceptable to the parties. In the 1969-1970 fiscal year, the
Commission issued 35 final orders. Five of them were appealed.
Two of the appeals, still pending in the district court, were of
orders denying petitions of Southern 3Union Gas Co. and Public
10
Service Co. for major rate increases.
97. Parmelee interview, supra note 53.
98. Id.
99. 25 P.S.C. Report 55-57 (1969-70), one complaint involved rate discrimination alleged by a
large-scale user, a second and third related to efforts of a rancher to block transmission line,
construction on an especially scenic tract of land.
100. P.S.C. case No. 850, 25 P.S.C. Report 57-58 (1968-69).
101. N.M. Elec. Serv. Co. v. N.M. Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 81 N.M. 683, 472 P.2d 648 (1970).
102. 17 P.S.C. Report 41 (1960-61).
103. 26 P.S.C. 57 (1969-70).
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C. The Process in Terms of A dministrative Law
"The rise of administrative bodies," said Mr. Justice Jackson in
a 1952 opinion, "probably has been the most significant legal
,"104 Administrative decisions, he
trend of the last century ..
pointed out, affect far more people than those of the courts.
".. . [T]he administrative process affects nearly everyone in

many ways nearly every day," writes another authority. 10 5 That is
clearly true of the Public Service Commission on whose decisions
most consumers run up bills daily and hourly.
The rapid development of the law has brought with it
formulation of a number of specific problem areas. Those that
seem to have immediate relevance to the Commission include
problems of investigation, issues involved in rule making,
problems of institutional decision, questions of notice, bias,
concern for retroactivity and the problem of primary jurisdiction.
The Public Utility Act confers on the Commission power to do
all things necessary and convenient in the exercise of its power
and jurisdiction. 10 6 It may inspect in the interest of safety, 07 to
assure accuracy of metering devices,' 0 8 and for adequacy of
service. 10 9 Utilities are required to keep uniform records,"10
which they may be required to produce before the Commission,
and which they must retain at an office within the state."1 The
Attorney General has upheld the power of the Commission to
order service shut off without notice to any party where it appears
12
that a hazardous condition exists.
Despite the Commission's broad grant of authority, actual field
inspections of records and plant installations are almost nonexistent. Safety inspections are carried out by the companies
themselves, except for those conducted under the Federal
Natural Gas Safety Act, 113 which are handled in New Mexico by
the State Corporation Commission. 114 Except for examinations
of records that precede relatively infrequent hearings on applica104.
105.
106.
107.
108.
109.
110.
Ill.
112.
113.
114.

F.T.C. v. Ruberoid Co., 343 U.S. 470, 487 (1952).
K. Davis, Administrative Law Text 3 (1959).
N.M. Stat. Ann. §68-5-4 (Repl. 1961. Supp. 1971).
N.M. Stat. Ann. § 68-5-24 (Repl. 1961).
N.M. Stat. Ann. § 68-5-23 (Repl. 1961).
N.M. Stat. Ann.§ 68-5-19(Repl. 1961).
N.M. Stat Ann. §68-5-16(Repl. 1961).
N.M.Stat. Ann. §68-5-17(Repl. 1961).
N.M. Atty. Gen. Opinion No. 69-81 (July 23, 1969).
Natural Gas Pipeline Safety, 49 U.S.C. § § 1671-84 (1968).
Parmelee interview, supra note 53.
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tions to increase rates, spot checks are rare. 115 The Commission's
budget does not provide for enough people at sufficiently high
levels of competence to perform ongoing inspections and investigations.
This state of affairs concerns the staff. Realistic determinations
of cost of service depend entirely on thorough and professional
audits of company records. Without such audits, it is impossible
to determine whether certain large customers are unduly favored,
and whether net return to the company is justified by sound
accounting and business practice." I6
Rule making power is granted the Commission in many
different parts of the Public Utility Act. Article III of the act
confers powers and duties, together with the authority to make
necessay rules. 117 The Commission must enter all its orders on its
own records. 118
It is generally considered that sound rule-making involves
participation of the parties. Procedures for obtaining such
participation include presentations and conferences, advisory
committees, hearings and provisions for legislative and executive
review. 119 Nowhere does the statute require the Commission to
elicit participation of any kind.
In practice, the Commission gives notice to affected utilities
well before promulgation of new or changed rules. Generally, the
companies are expected to respond with objection in writing. The
procedure may be very informal, including personal visits
and telephone calls. These procedures have not presented
problems in the past, although the companies do request, from
time to time, that changes be made. Several amendments, for
example, alter record-keeping requirements to conform to
national industry standards. 120
D. The Problem of Bias
One who stands to gain or lose personally by a decision either
way is disqualified by reason of interest. 121 Accordingly, the
Public Utility Act provides that no commissioner may own the
115.
116.
117.
118.
119.
120.
121.

Id.
Id.
N.M. Stat. Ann. § 68-5-I to 24 (Repl. 1961. Supp. 1971).
N.M. Stat. Ann.§ 68-8-12 (Repl. 1961).
Davis, supra note 105 at 101-08.
See, e.g.. N.M. Pub. Serv. Comm'n Gen. Orders 13. 14, 21 and 22 (April 15. 1965).
Davis, supra note 105 at 220.
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securities of or any interest in any public utility. 12 2 And it

employees from rendering services
prohibits commissioners and
123
of any kind to any utility.
But "[olne meaning of bias is a preconceived point of view
about issues of law or policy. .

.

. [cilosely related but distingui-

shable is bias or prejudgment concerning issues of fact about the
parties in a particular case. .... "124
There are several identifiable sources of bias in the proceedings
of the Public Service Commission. The commissioners themselves
are subject to Ulrich, and can be expected to carry to the
Commission a number of political loyalties and obligations. The
fair value method is in effect an instrument of bias, which
benefits utilities by rendering issues incomprehensible to the
public at large and to consumers. Likewise, the inadequacy of the
Commission's staff, when measured against the manpower available to the utilities, results in a record that typically favors the
companies' contentions.
Most of these biases tend to favor the companies, as opposed
to consumers and the public interest. If that is true, it should
follow that companies enjoying a favored position will show high
rates of profitability, obtained by high rates for service. As the
next section of this report will show, that is precisely what
happens.
SYSTEM OUTPUTS AND THEIR EFFECTS

Thus far we have examined and evaluated the Public Service
Commission's structure, its environment and the shape of matters
coming before it for decision-the input factors. Two defects
stood out above all others: the Ulrich problem and the fair value
standard. We have also reviewed the Commission's procedures
for reaching decisions. Still to be examined are the output factors,
which will be assessed in terms of the Commission's statutory
charge, and evaluated in terms of social and economic effects.
These effects, after all, are what the entire system is about.
The Commission's outputs are two. First it issues certificates
of necessity or convenience franchising utility companies to build
and operate facilities to produce and transmit energy. Second, it
issues tariffs-the rates that consumers of energy are required to
122. N.M. Stat. Ann. § 68-4-4 (Repl. 1961).
123. N.M. Stat. Ann. § 68-5-3 (Repl. 1961).
124. Davis, supra note 105 at 220.
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pay for its use. In reaching the decisions that underlie these
documentary outputs, the Commission is instructed by statute
that:
it is the declared policy of the state that the public interest, the
interest of consumers, and the interest of investors require the
regulation and supervision of such public utilities to the end that
reasonable and proper services shall be available at fair, just and
reasonable rates, and to the end that capital and investment may
be encouraged and attracted so as to provide for the construction,
development and extension, without unnecessary duplication and
economic waste, of proper plants and facilities for the rendition of
125
service to the general public and to industry.

In assessing the manner in which the Public Service Commission carries out this charge, two facts are inescapable: First, rates
charged the State's consumers are among the nation's highest;
and second, earnings of the State's utility companies are among
the nation's highest. It appears, therefore, that the interest of
investors is emphasized at the expense of the consumer interest.
A. Rates to Consumers
1. Some Generalizationson Cost
It would seem that the resource factors of energy production
are in good supply in New Mexico. New Mexico is commonly
reported to be fourth, fifth or sixth in the nation in production of
natural gas. Gas is the fundamental energy resource, because
practically all electricity generated for intra-state consumption is
developed in gas-fired plants. 126 Moreover, natural gas is New
Mexico's major source of heat energy. 127 Electrical generating
capacity if considered quite adequate at present. There is excess
energy available to New Mexicans from Four Corners' plants. 28
The final factor of energy production is money. Though the
state's economy is regarded as deficient in terms of funds
available for private investment, 2 9 New Mexico's utilities have
never encountered difficulties in raising money on the national
125. N.M. Stat. Ann. § 68-3-1B (Supp. 1971).
126. Interview with Shirley Huzarski, Data Bank Supervisor, Bureau of Business Research,
U.N.M., at Albuquerque, New Mexico, Nov. 14, 1971. Mrs. Huzarski reports that major
inaccuracies of data collection have been discovered in this field, and that current statistics are
considered very unreliable.
127. Id., referring to the 1970 Census of Housing and Population.
128. Id.
129. Id.
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financial market. 130 The Public Service Commission's reports for
the period from July 1, 1968, to June 30, 1970, show that
regulated companies sold a total of $125.1 million in debt
securities during that two-year period, and an additional $5
million-plus in common and preferred stock. A total of thirty-one
issuances were authorized, of which many were in the $20,000
range and of which the largest was a $16 million Public Service
Co. sale of seven and one-quarter percent first mortgage bonds.
Many small issues carried the two percent interest rate available
to rural cooperatives from the federal government. Other rates
varied from seven-plus to nine-plus percent, reflecting tightness
in the money markets. But there is no indication whatever that
investment funds are unavailable for New Mexico energy
development, or that New Mexicans must pay premium rates to
131
obtain them.
Money is an especially important production factor in the
utility industry, which is highly capital-intensive and a very low
ranking user of labor. Electrical utilities maintain about $4.33 of
plant per dollar of annual revenue: the figure for natural gas
utilities is $3.61. By contrast, the automobile industry, while a
heavy user of labor, maintains only forty-three cents of plant for
each dollar of annual sales, and manufacturing industries as a
only twenty-five cents of plant per annual sales
whole maintain
13 2
dollar.
In short, examination of the factors of production in the utility
industry indicates no factor in which New Mexico utilities are at
any particular disadvantage when compared to other utilities
elsewhere in the country. On the contrary, their ready access to
fuel is an important advantage.
2. The Rates Proper
Rates are scheduled on two sets of variables. They vary with
the amount of energy consumed-the larger the number of units,
the lower the unit cost to the user-and they vary with location.
There is no obvious pattern, but consumers in different parts of
New Mexico pay markedly different rates.
The Federal Power Commission compares rates on the basis of
130. Interview with Tom Corr, Vice-President for Community Relations (Ret.), Southern
Union Gas Co., in Albuquerque, New Mexico, Oct. 16, 1971.
131. 25 P.S.C. Report (1969-70); 25 P.S.C. Report (1968-69).
132. P. Stathas, Some Future Considerations and Implicationsfor Regulated Industries and
Regulatory Agencies, in the Economics of Regulation of Public Utilities 173 (Northwestern U.
Conf. 1966) [hereinafter cited Northwestern Papers].
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a fixed number of units for typical household, commercial and
industrial consumption, and averages across jurisdictions. The
Commission concludes that New Mexico ranks 36th in the nation
in cost of electrical energy-consumers in 14 states pay more, and
consumers in 35 states pay less. 133 New Mexico's average figure
for small households is $7.67. There are significant variations,
however, within the state. Consumers purchasing power from El
Paso Electric pay a low $6.75, Albuquerqueans buy the same
energy from Public Service Co. for $7.18, and Socorro residents
pay a high of $9.25. Nor is there the slightest uniformity in
percentages of increase from one user class to the next. 134
When the focus shifts to commercial users, the picture changes.
For relatively small to middle-sized commercial accounts, energy
charges in New Mexico are slightly below the national average.
But for large commercial users, those drawing at least 200,000
kilowatt hours monthly, the New Mexico bill is seven percent
more than the national average, and exceeded in only seven of
the fifty states. 135
Natural gas rates show a similar pattern of variation. A
medium-sized household bill might range from $15.00 in Hobbs,
served by Hobbs Gas Co. with gas of unusually high heating
value, to $25.95 in Ruidoso, served by a small local utility with
gas of a quality somewhat lower than that delivered in Hernandez. Since prices are set by million cubic feet, the Ruidoso
consumer will pay even more than the rate quoted to obtain the
actual heat energy sold in Hernandez for $15.00. The net effect of
both quality and price differentials is on the order of seventy-five
percent in favor of Hernandez-a substantial differential indeed. 136
The largest users of energy contract with producers for special
rates, subject to Commission ratification. Such negotiated rates
are the subject of much concern on the parts of commissioners
and staff. They believe that at least some negotiated contracts call
for sales at less than cost, and thus involve a direct subsidy.
In one instance, near Deming, household users have complained of such discrimination. At issue are low charges for
power delivered to irrigators, as against relatively high charges
133.
134.
135.
136.

Federal Power Commission, Typical Electric Bills 1968, x (1968).
Parker, supra note 22 at 837.
Parker, supra note 22 at 835.
26 P.S.C. Report 30-31, Table 10 (1969-70).
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for residential use. The electric company contends that its rates
are justified, because if irrigation charges were to increase, the
local cotton growers would switch to natural gas. 137 Assuming
there is good support in public policy for subsidizing service to
certain users, or for subsidizing the competitive positions of
certain utilities, the reasons for doing so have not been explored
to date by any state regulatory agency.
B. Returns to Companies
There are 206 major privately owned electrical utilities in the
United States. Of that number, twenty-six earned net incomes of
nineteen percent or more of gross operating revenues. Of those
twenty-six, three were located in New Mexico. New Mexico's five
investor-owned power companies averaged net incomes of 16.4
percent of gross revenues, or one full percentage point more than
American utilities as a whole. The two companies not at the high
end of the range were well below the mid-point at 12.1 and 9.2
percent. 138 In terms of net income, New Mexico utilities varied in
rate of return by more than 100 percent. This suggests that some
utilities are not receiving the rate approvals that enable others to
realize higher earnings. Alternatively, the lower-earning utilities
may not be, for any one of several reasons, as effective as the
higher-earning ones in their relationships with the Commission
139
and with other regulatory bodies with whom they deal.
Discrimination between and among companies may be implied from these facts. But even at 9.2 percent, the worst
performer among the five is a reasonable attractive investment.
Only the top twenty percent of major American corporations
earn fifteen percent or more; another forty percent fail to earn as
much as nine percent. More than sixty percent of all large
American firms earn between seven and twelve percent on
a49
revenues.
In the conventional wisdom of the investment community,
high rates of return are associated with high risks, or with
stagnation, in terms of prospects for growth. Neither justification
137. Parmelee interview, supra note 53.
138. Parker, supra note 22 at 837-38.
139. Three of the five companies have substantial operations in Texas. One of the three is the
best performer in terms of earnings, and another is the worst.
140. L. Pendleton, Economic and Regulatory Problems of the Communications Industry, in
Northwestern Papers, supra note 132 at 34 et seq.
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appears to support earnings on the order of twenty percent
achieved by New Mexico utilities.
Utilities, says one authority, are not very risky:
The conventional

. . .

method employed

to appraise

relative

degree of risk has been to compare the fluctuations in rates of
return of various industries and firms over some past period of
time. .

.

. Most such analyses that I have made and seen show

that the fluctations in rates of return of utility enterprises . . .
have been of lower magnitude than those of industrial concerns.
Among the utilities, the magnitude of these fluctuations usually fall
in the following order: (1) telephone (with greatest fluctuation), (2)
natural gas pipeline, (3) natural gas distribution, and (4) electric
141
power (with least).

Nor do utilities appear to be stagnating. The population of
New Mexico has grown markedly in the last generation. That
growth has slowed in recent years, but there is no reason to
believe that New Mexico's utility companies are trapped in a
stagnant economic situation. They have substantial opportunities
for growth.
On the strength of the survey, it is difficult to see anything in
the factors of production, in the business situations of the
companies, or in the status and characteristics of the energy-consuming public that justifies the unusually high rates of earnings
of New Mexico's regulated utilities. It is hard to escape the
conclusion that, in the regulatory process of the Public Service
Commission, the investor interest is favored over the interests of
consumers and public. Two questions remain. Why is that so?
And what can be done about it?
C. The Biasfor the Investor Interest
Where bias exists in the administrative process, it must be
attributable to deficiencies in that process' structure, its inputs, or
its process as such. This study has identified a number of such
deficiencies:
The heritage of Ulrich assures that commissioners carry into office
political and personal loyalties that inhibit objectivity and, more
important, constrain the Commission against taking positive and
affirmative action to enlarge its budget and to increase the scope of
its regulatory activity.
The fair value basis for rate-making is cumbersome and conjectural
141. B. Kolb, The Role of Risk in Public Utility Regulation. in Northwestern Papers, supra note
132 at 152.
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at best. At worst, it masks reality behind a cloud of financial fiction.
And its presence in the statute forestalls serious consideration of
alternative methods of rate setting.
The Commission's staff is inadequate to do much more than handle
office routine and conduct hearings. It is incapable of field
inspection and auditing. It lacks the manpower to perform
meaningful studies for policy guidance. Without adequate staff
support, the Commission cannot act affirmatively in new directions
such as the regulation of the environment.
Competence and expertise of the judiciary are likewise undermined
by provisions for appellate procedure that prevent the accumulation of experience in any single court.

Of these deficiencies, the Ulrich problem and the difficulties of
the fair value method stand out. Their implications are extensive.
Moreover, unless these two problems are cured, or at least
mitigated, they will block efforts to make less fundamental
changes.
The holding in Ulrich goes directly to tenure on the Commission, and to the attitudes and loyalties that commissioners bring
to their jobs. It places the tenure of commissioners at the pleasure
of a Governor who must, in the partisan political arena, look
frequently to the preferences and desires of utility company
executives. Thus, Ulrich assures not only that tenure on the
Commission will be limited to gubernatorial terms of office, but
that appointments to the Commission will be limited to those
persons who present no offense to influential utility interests.
It is contrary to these interests that the Commission be staffed
to aggressively carry out its statutory duties, or that hard and
precise thinking be devoted by staff, Commission, or courts to the
utilities' own proposals for rate increases and service franchises.
Therefore, unless the fundamental problem of Commission
tenure can be resolved, it is unlikely that meaningful correction
can be made in derivative problem areas.
The fair value process shrouds all Commission processes in a
miasmic fog of conjecture, unsupported assertion, unprovable
claims, and corporate self interest. Sound administrative procedure is capable of moving this fog from place to place but is not
capable of dispelling it. The fair value standard contributes to
confusion of facts and difficulty of decision. It renders the
contentions of one party practically inaccessible to affected
members of the public, for only that party can understand his
own contentions.
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"The present rate base method is nonsense," says one member
of the Commission staff. "It's question-begging. The real question is, what does the company need? We shouldn't let
unconscionable amounts flow through to investors, not where
there's low risk." 1 42 Ultimately, if the consumer interest is to be
balanced with the interest of investors, commissioners must have
tenure and the fair value standard must be overturned.
D. Bias: What Can Be Done
1. Burying Ulrich
There are four means of overruling Ulrich. One is by amending
the State Constitution. 143 A second is by amending the statute
conferring tenure on the commission.' 44 A third means would
involve a commissioner refusing to leave office, in the hope that
the State Supreme Court would overrule its prior holding. And a
fourth involves a willingness on the part of several governors in
sequence to recognize the mandate of the act as written. Nothing
is impossible, but the fourth alternative is rather unlikely. Very
few elected officials can be expected to give up a practice that
costs so little and is worth so much. In fact, none have done so
since the Commission was established in 1941. The other three
alternatives seem somewhat more feasible.
A constitutional amendment, while desirable in terms of the
Commission's needs, and probably in terms of the needs of many
other agencies, presents two problems: first, the Commission's
weakness in legislative politics, and second, the difficulty commonly encountered by amendments generally, when they reach
the New Mexico electorate. The Commission, acting alone,
would seem to stand little chance of negotiating all the hurdles.
But with substantial support from other state administrative
agencies and from an informed public, the idea seems feasible.
Amending the statute, to add mandatory language on tenure,
leaves the problems of legislative politics and possible gubernatorial veto, but avoids that of electoral approval. Again, the
Commission's weakness probably requires allies for the fray.
Such alliances, however, are relatively feasible for the short
142. Parmelee interview. supra note 53.
143. N.M. Const. art. 5. § 5.
144. N.M. Stat. Ann. § 68-4-2 (Supp. 1971).
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periods of time required for legislative success. They tend to fold
while awaiting elections on constitutional amendments.
A challenge to the statute seems less likely to succeed.
Commissioners are appointed in the first place because they are
unoffensive to utility interests and because they are well-connected in partisan politics. Such a person may be quite reluctant to
resist termination. If he does so, and loses, he cannot expect to
retain either his job or his political friendships. Assuming there
might be a commissioner of unusual intestinal fortitude, however, he can resist his removal on at least three points of law. The
first is Mr. Justice Parker's dissent, which would have limited the
145
Governor's firing power to persons he himself has appointed.
Second, there is the fact that the Ulrich decision came down 14
years before enactment of the Public Utility Act in 1941. Since
the language that derogates the decision was enacted subsequent
to the decision, it can be argued to override the law of the earlier
case.
A courageous commissioner might find a third point of
reliance in Humphrey's Ex'r. v. United States, 146 decided by the
U.S. Supreme Court in 1935. In that case, the Court limited the
right of the chief executive to remove appointed officials where
the official served as commissioner of a legislatively created
agency with quasi-judicial functions.
Enactment of a constitutional amendment seems difficult. A
massive infusion of gubernatorial virtue seems unlikely. The best
alternatives seem to be amendatory legislation, which seems
quite feasible with reasonable public support, or opposition to
termination, carried into the courts.

2. Fair Value: Dispellingthe Fog
147
Use of the fair value standard is mandated by statute.
Getting it out of the statute will require legislation. As this study
has pointed out the Commission is weak in legislative politics.
That weakness is attested by the very short shrift given by the
House Committee on Corporations and Banking of the 1971
State Legislature to a measure intended to do away with fair
145. 32 N.M. 265, 255 P. 1077.
146. 295 U.S. 602 (1935).
147. N.M. Stat. Ann. §68-5-14 (Repl. 1961).
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value. 148 Nevertheless, if fair value is to be done away with, a
legislative confrontation seems unavoidable. In both partisan and
legislative politics, the utilities are tough, able, experienced and
influential. They cannot be expected to let fair value be defeated
without a fight.
Moreover, the Commissions's natural allies in such a battle are
likely to be far from the field. No other state administrative
agency is going to get anywhere near the fray. And the general
public, given the mysteries of the subject, is unlikely to have the
faintest idea that anything is happening.
3. "The Bigger the Issue . . ."
"The public's taste in issues is less than outstanding," says one
authority on administrative law. But he goes on to concede that,
where the public is strongly involved in the decisional process, it
is capable of strongly influencing outcomes, and processes as
well. 1 4 9 "The public," says another student of the subject, "as

well as the regulated must fully accept regulation. That acceptance will strengthen the regulatory process."' 15 0
In essence, the consuming public needs to perceive that its
interests are at stake in utility regulation, organize to protect its
interests, and apply pressure in sensitive areas of the State
Legislature, of state government and of the utilities themselves.
"The bigger the issue, the harder it is to keep it within
conventional processes. 1 15
Issues can become big in a number or ways. Some are exposed
in books, magazines or newspapers. Others result from dedicated
work (or agitation) on the part of a small group of people.
However, an issue becomes big, the process starts with someone
becoming acquainted with the facts. It is a great virtue of the fair
value standard, from the companies' standpoint, that it is not
subject to factual comprehension.
Other issues in which the Commission plays, a role are less
difficult to understand. The environmental threats traceable to
utility activities in the Four Corners area have brought the
Commission under the active scrutiny of several substantial
citizens' groups. Perhaps this interest, though tangential to most
148.
149.
150.
151.

H.B. 260, 30th N.M. St. Legislature, 1st Sess. (1971).
Lecture by Albert Utton, supra note 47.
Priest, Some Bases of Public Utility Regulations, 36 Miss. L.J. 18, 28 (1964).
Lecture by Albert Utton, supra note 47.
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of the actual work of the Commission, can be translated into
concern with other areas of utility operation.
In recent years, the citizenry has shown a decreasing inclination to sit back and be regulated. "A new insistence upon citizen
involvement or participation has also been stimulated by the
essentially personal or emotional nature of issues which have
years, such as equal
been uppermost in the public mind in recent
15 2
environment.'
the
of
rights and protection
The same authority suggests several means by which the public
can participate in the administrative process. These include filing
complaints, service on program planning and advisory committees, attendance at public hearings, and direct participation by
formal intervention. 153 All these methods are sound. All have
proven effective in various situations. But the list seems to
overlook the obvious: the value of honest-to-God hell-raising.
The informed critic at precinct or other political meetings, the
worker who effectively convinces and converts his friends, and
the dedicated citizen watching the actual behavior of politicians,
legislators and office holders are, to the practicing public man,
fearsome and influential sights. Their very presence may clarify
in his mind issues previously difficult of resolution. Their
conviction may prove contagious.
"Participation by representative groups of citizens, other than
those who have a primarily partisan interest, can inform the
agency and presumably assist it in reaching a decision which will
further the public interest or accommodate the public convenience and necessity," says one authority. And he goes on, "The
degree to which society will be benefited by such massive citizen
involvement will be determined, for the most part, by the
54
discipline, responsibility, and wisdom of the participants.'
High standards, indeed, but it is hard to see that citizen
participation, even if less than totally disinterested and objective,
can have effects worse than the nonparticipation that has been
characteristic of the last thirty years.
A number of governments, including New York City, New
York State, California and the federal government have attempted to institutionalize consumerism within their bureaucra152.
Action,
153.
154.

Hanes, Citizen. Participationand Its Empact Upon Prompt and Responsible Administrative
24 Sw. L.J. 731, 732 (1970).
Id at 732-36.
Id.at 736.
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cies. New Mexico made the same attempt with an office of
consumer counsel within the Public Service Commission some
years ago and with a consumer frauds division in the office of the
Attorney General at present. Though these agencies seem to
display many of the structural weaknesses and defects of
relationships within the political environment that the Commission exhibits, there are some authorities who see these as the
primary means of regularizing consumer concerns within
governmental processes. 155 That conclusion is not foregone.
Though organizational obstacles are great and hazards to continuity are formidable, it may well be feasible to organize effective
pressure outside government, as has been done in recent years by
environmentalists. Such independent organization (e.g., the
Sierra Club) has many political, economic and social advantages.
4. Improving the Process
With Ulrich dead and buried, the fog of fair value forever
dispelled, and the citizen concern requisite for these achievements in being, the remaining deficiences identified in this study
should not prove difficult to overcome. Staffing levels are a
function of budget, which is a function, in turn, of strength in
legislative politics. And given adequate staff and the strength of
conviction that results from secure tenure, nothing prevents the
Commission from ordering frequent audits and field inspection,
and from examining the records to assure itself that no service is
delivered by a New Mexico public utility at less than cost.
With the end of fair value, confusion in the record should
diminish as the record itself is confined to facts supportable in the
account books. Appellate decisions should be similarly simplified.
CONCLUSIONS

Impressions are impossible to footnote and often difficult to
begin to explain. Several impressions emerge from this study that
might well be included here.
The commissioners and their staff want to do a good job. They
take seriously their tripartite duties to the consumer interest, the
public welfare, and the well-being of investors. Bias, as developed in this study, is certainly not a matter of influence peddling
or back room intrigue. It is a matter of legal structure. It is a
155. Interview with David Hamilton, Professor of Economics, U.N.M., in Albuquerque, New
Mexico, Oct. 15, 1971. See also D. Hamilton, Consumer Protection in New Mexico No. 54 (1971).
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matter of human nature, in the sense that there are some things
people do willingly, and other things they do not at all. The
statutory insertions and the decisional law result from able
counsel doing and doing effectively, precisely what counsel are
supposed to do. And incumbent commissioners can hardly be
expected to butt their heads against the brick wall of legislative
politics, given their situations in life and the facts of New
Mexico's political environment.
Where action is less difficult to take, commissioners have
proven demonstrably willing to take it. In the last two years, each
of New Mexico's two largest utilities requested substantial rate
increases. In each case the Commission denied the application.
But in approaching the legislature for statutory changes, they
come as supplicants, one among many. Among the many, they
are among the weaker.
Given the structural nature of problems of tenure and fair
value, it seems impressive that much change can be accomplished
by minor alterations in law. But while the prospects for change
do loom large, they should not be overrated. Were Ulrich to be
buried tomorrow, there would remain all the weight of years of
political habit. Such burdens are rarely thrown off quickly. By the
same token, intelligent lawyers and accountants, even without
fair value to fall back on, can be expected to find forceful
arguments for their clients. What one hopes for in removing the
fair value standard is that these advisors will thereafter be
required to hold their arguments closer to relatively determinable
facts.
Finally, this study indicates clearly that the institutions of
democratic government function best when the interests concerned forcefully and effectively represent themselves, and function
poorly when any of those interests are absent from the
proceedings. For thirty years, the New Mexico utility industry
has presented its case, consistently, year in and year out. The
public has not been heard-not because the public has been kept
out, but because it has not chosen to come in. No law, no process
and probably no human invention can do for people what people
do not do for themselves.
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